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SELF-DETERMINATION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: RE-
IMAGINING SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW  
Dr Edward Guntrip* 
Abstract: 
International investment law can be criticized for its understanding of sovereignty. Informed 
by the works of Koskenniemi, this article re-imagines ‘sovereignty’ based on a host state 
population exercising its right to economic self-determination. Recent transparency initiatives 
in international investment law support this conceptualization of sovereignty. Further, the 
stance taken aligns with the continuous evolution of the international investment law regime. 
The establishment of a different perspective on sovereignty in international investment law 
highlights the need for an alternative understanding of this term if international investment 
law is to achieve widespread approval. 
Keywords: international investment law, international investment agreements, sovereignty, 
economic self-determination, Koskenniemi. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International investment law (IIL) can be criticized for its understanding of sovereignty. In 
IIL, sovereignty is exercised when host states consent to investment protection standards 
contained in international investment agreements (IIAs). The legality of any subsequent state 
practice is restricted by reference to these standards. Over the last two decades alone, Chapter 
11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),1 the draft Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment2 and investment chapters in Free Trade Agreements such as the 
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement3 have generated debate over the 
extent to which IIAs delimit state sovereignty.4 Investment tribunals reinforce this approach 
to sovereignty when they prioritize the terms of IIAs over host state sovereign powers. As a 
result, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) has been decried as a means of permitting 
foreign investors to undermine host states’ regulatory powers.5 In light of these discussions, 
this article presents a divergent view of how the term sovereignty is capable of being 
understood in IIL. 
The concept of sovereignty is flexible and can be interpreted in a variety of ways in 
public international law. For example, a state can construe sovereignty so as to justify state 
conduct, whilst another state will refer to sovereignty to denounce the same act.6 According 
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1 North American Free Trade Agreement (adopted 17 December 1992, entered into force 1 January 1994) 
(1993) 32 ILM 289, 605 (NAFTA). 
2 See N Wallace-Bruce, ‘The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: An Indecent Proposal and not Learning the 
Lessons of History’ (2001) 2 Journal of World Investment 53. 
3 Full details are available at <ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/>. 
4 See J Karl, ‘International Investment Arbitration: A Threat to State Sovereignty?’ in W Shan, P Simons and D 
Singh (eds), Redefining Sovereignty in International Economic Law (Hart Publishing 2008) 225; L Cotula, ‘Do 
Investment Treaties Unduly Constrain Regulatory Space?’ (2014) 9 Questions of International Law 19. 
5 L Wells, ‘Backlash to Investment Arbitration: Three Causes’ in Waibel et al. (eds.), The Backlash Against 
Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer 2010) 341. 
6 M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (CUP 2005) 225. 
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to Koskenniemi, debates over the meaning of legal terminology, such as sovereignty, reflect 
the nature of legal argumentation in public international law.7 International lawyers create 
legal arguments using the vocabulary of public international law to justify or criticize state 
conduct.8 As legal terms like sovereignty do not have a specific meaning, international 
lawyers seek to achieve political aims through varied interpretations of these terms.9 The use 
of legal terminology to mask a political agenda has implications when decision-makers are 
required to resolve a dispute. Given that legal terminology lacks fixed legal content, when 
decision-makers select their preferred argument, they are in effect, choosing a political 
position.10 Therefore, in public international law, terms such as sovereignty are used to 
pursue political aims which decision-makers endorse when deciding disputes.  
Using this aspect of Koskenniemi’s work, this article focuses on how decision-makers in 
IIL currently view sovereignty and promotes a viable alternative to the dominant 
interpretation of this term. It is asserted that decision-makers in IIL currently favour a 
normative approach to sovereignty by prioritizing legal standards in IIAs above the ability of 
the host state to regulate conduct within their jurisdiction. This interpretation reflects a 
specific political agenda within the IIL regime. This article presents an alternative political 
viewpoint and argues that sovereignty in IIL can be sourced from the will of the host state 
population. This understanding of sovereignty permits a host state to rely on factual and 
political justifications for its failure to comply with investment protection standards. As a 
result, sovereignty is not necessarily a legal concept that curtails host state conduct through 
the operation of IIAs. By using a new paradigm, this article challenges the presumptions 
underlying how sovereignty is currently understood in IIL and reconceptualizes its role in 
relation to foreign direct investment (FDI). To achieve its aims this article proceeds as 
follows. Part 2 outlines the theoretical framework by introducing ideas from Koskenniemi’s 
writings that discuss the process of legal argumentation and decision-making in public 
international law. Part 3 argues that the currently accepted view of sovereignty in IIL 
emphasizes legal limitations above sovereign power in order to achieve the aims of the IIL 
regime. Part 4 sets out an alternative understanding of sovereignty in IIL that is primarily 
sourced from the host state population exercising its right to economic self-determination. 
Part 5 justifies the adoption of this approach by reference to the growing trend for 
transparency during both the negotiation stages of IIAs and as part of ISDS. Part 6 considers 
the wider implications of altering the foundations of sovereignty in IIL and submits that the 
proposed approach is unlikely to require wholesale changes to IIL. Conclusions are drawn in 
Part 7.  
II. RE-IMAGINING SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW  
Koskenniemi argues that the term sovereignty is ambiguous.11 He illustrates this point using 
the Rights of Passage case,12 in which both Portugal and India relied on the notion of 
sovereignty to support opposing positions.13 Given the disputing parties’ contradictory 
																																								 																				
7 ibid 17, 59, 573. 
8 ibid 566. 
9 ibid 570, 589. 
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Practice’ in M Koskenniemi (ed.), The Politics of International Law (Hart Publishing 2011) 281. 
11 Koskenniemi (n 6) 225, 226. 
12 Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) (Merits) [1960] ICJ Rep 6. 
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application of the same concept, this dispute could not be resolved by reference to a singular 
definition of sovereignty.14 As such, sovereignty is capable of being comprehended in a 
variety of ways. 
According to Koskenniemi, diverse interpretations of terms like sovereignty are 
attributable to the process of legal argumentation.15 International lawyers formulate legal 
arguments centred on principles of international law.16 They support their arguments using 
both law and fact, but will accentuate either fact or law to assert a particular viewpoint.17 
International lawyers may emphasize facts by either distinguishing or drawing analogies with 
previous state conduct to support their claim.18 Alternatively, they may prioritize legal norms 
to challenge the ‘unique’ factual circumstances of the case.19 However, as illustrated by the 
Rights of Passage case, this approach to legal argumentation does not enable a dispute to be 
resolved. This is because it is impossible to reconcile legal and factual arguments regarding 
sovereignty20 as each position cancels the other out.21 Therefore, Koskenniemi maintains that 
neither legal nor fact-based arguments inherently prevail.22  
As all legal argumentation is equally valid, differing interpretations of legal terms are 
plausible. On this basis, Koskenniemi concludes that the substantive content of legal 
principles such as sovereignty are incapable of possessing a fixed meaning.23 The 
indeterminacy of terms like sovereignty generates a weakness in every argument. If law is 
minimized in legal argumentation, international lawyers are claiming that state conduct is not 
regulated and that states are conferred with unrestrained power.24 Conversely, if law is 
prioritized, then international lawyers rely on norms that provide for idealized behaviour, 
which are not necessarily reflective of reality.25 Consequently, every legal argument can be 
critiqued for erring towards either the recognition of unregulated state power or the 
privileging of a legal norm.26  
By prioritizing fact or law, international lawyers are able to tailor the content of legal 
principles to suit their argument. Koskenniemi contends that the practice of legal 
argumentation becomes a process by which international lawyers assert a political stance 
using a legal term as the foundation for their view27 (often with reference to additional 
principles of international law to support their position).28 Therefore, sovereignty can being 
interpreted to support the exercise of state power to aid one political view, whilst it can also 
be construed to prevent the use of state power to achieve a different political aim. Which 
approach is taken in each instance will depend on the political interests of the state 
concerned. The legal arguments presented will broadly reflect the generally accepted, 
																																								 																				
14 ibid. 
15 ibid, 17, 59, 573. 
16 ibid 566. 
17 ibid 572. 
18 ibid 59. 
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21 Koskenniemi (n 6) 65, 597; Koskenniemi (n 10) 272. 
22 Koskenniemi (n 20) 16. 
23 Koskenniemi (n 6) 62 – 63, 591; Koskenniemi (n 10) 275. 
24 Koskenniemi (n 6) 60; Koskenniemi (n 20) 8. 
25 Koskenniemi (n 6) 60; Koskenniemi (n 20) 8. 
26 Koskenniemi (n 6) 68 – 69. 
27 ibid 570, 589. 
28 E Jouannet, ‘Koskenniemi: A Critical Introduction’ in M Koskenniemi (ed.), The Politics of International 
Law (Hart Publishing 2011) 11. 
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mainstream understanding of a term and minority positions that are regularly asserted to 
challenge the dominant viewpoint.29  
Decision-makers in public international law give preference to one argument over 
another. As each legal argument reflects a political agenda, decision-makers are effectively 
selecting a political position.30 Therefore, in each case involving sovereignty, the decision-
maker will either be permitting or denying the exercise of sovereignty to achieve a political 
goal. The decision made will be influenced by the argument presented, its unique context, the 
specific claim and how the particular audience views these contributing factors.31 Given the 
variability involved in each case, the outcome of legal disputes will oscillate between 
arguments that favour law and those that favour fact.32 When the political preferences of 
decision-makers result in the consistent adoption of an argument, the understanding of the 
legal term that results will become the mainstream view.33 As nothing in international law is 
fixed, Koskenniemi stresses that the mainstream view is capable of shifting depending on the 
prevailing political circumstances.34  
The decision made will additionally be guided by the structural bias that exists within the 
decision-making body.35 Koskenniemi identifies that the significance of structural bias has 
increased with the fragmentation of public international law,36 evidenced by the transition of 
power from states to regimes.37 As a result, international law is uniformly governed through 
specialist legal instruments38 that are administered by international bodies, each possessing a 
specific ethos.39 When presenting legal arguments, international lawyers (if they wish to 
succeed) must adopt the regime’s unique terminology to ensure that their argument mirrors 
the aims of the regime.40 Structural bias results in decisions that favour state conduct that 
maximizes the outcome(s) that are deemed to be desirable by each specific regime.41 This 
predisposition dictates whether arguments that privilege law or fact are accepted.42 Therefore, 
as regimes seek to regulate states differently, how sovereignty is understood in each regime 
varies. As a result, the concept of sovereignty in IIL will have a particular understanding that 
mirrors the aims of the regime.  
																																								 																				
29 Koskenniemi (n 6) 569, 572, 607; M Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’, 
(2004) 17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 197, 202. 
30 Koskenniemi (n 10) 281. 
31 Koskenniemi (n 6) 571. 
32 ibid 65; Koskenniemi (n 29) 201. 
33 Koskenniemi (n 6) 569 – 570. 
34 ibid 570; Koskenniemi (n 29) 201. 
35 Koskenniemi (n 6) 610 (some choices are ‘methodologically privileged in the relevant institutions’); M 
Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 70 MLR 1, 4; M 
Koskenniemi, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
of International Law’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006) para 488. 
36 M Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later’, (2009) 20 EJIL 7, 9. 
37 ibid 12; M Koskenniemi, ‘What Use for Sovereignty Today?’ (2011) 1 Asian Journal of International Law 
61, 65; Koskenniemi, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’ (n 35) para 487. 
38 Koskenniemi (n 37) 64. 
39 M Koskenniemi, ‘Conclusion: vocabularies of sovereignty – powers of a paradox’, in H Kalmo and Q Skinner 
(eds), Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (CUP 2010) 231; M 
Koskenniemi, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’ (n 35) para 488. 
40 For a description of this bias see M Koskenniemi, ‘International Law: Constitutionalism, Managerialism and 
the Ethos of Legal Education’ (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies 1, 5. 
41 M Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law’ (n 35) 6. 
42 ibid 4, 6; Koskenniemi (n 36) 12. 
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Despite each regime’s leanings, Koskenniemi identifies that the indeterminacy that gives 
rise to legal argumentation is not dampened when power is transferred into legal regimes.43 
Instead, each regime becomes ‘a platform of disagreement’44 where ‘prevailing 
“mainstreams” constantly clash against minority challengers’.45 Therefore, it remains 
possible to challenge mainstream understandings of terms such as sovereignty within the IIL 
regime by presenting an interpretation that supports an alternative political perspective. As 
the mainstream view can evolve, should a minority narrative align with the changing political 
preferences of the regime, this interpretation has the potential to become the mainstream 
view. 
Koskenniemi’s description of legal argumentation has been critiqued for failing to 
acknowledge the practice of public international law in its entirety. A key concern is that the 
examples used are extreme when compared to the general operation of public international 
law.46 For example, Koskenniemi’s use of cases before international tribunals as illustrations 
of legal argumentation have been claimed to overstate his position as he neglects to consider 
consensual means of creating public international law.47 Additionally, it has been suggested 
that the political choice of the decision-maker is not as unfettered as Koskenniemi indicates 
given the structured (and potentially biased) environment in which the decision is made.48 
Yet, despite these limitations, the essence of Koskenniemi’s writings captures the manner in 
which legal terms are capable of multiple constructions. Whilst these interpretations will not 
always involve disputes that escalate to the level of adversarial cases before tribunals, they do 
force decision-makers to select their preferred political view (even if this is influenced by the 
institutional context in which the decision is being made). It is the availability of alternative 
understandings of legal terms that results from this practice, and the ensuing political choice 
between these alternatives, that forms the premise of this article.  
In conclusion, whilst Koskenniemi’s works are not accepted without question, they 
provide a framework to explain how legal argumentation and decision-making operate in 
public international law. This is founded upon the parity of legal argumentation and the 
indeterminacy of legal terms that preclude concepts like sovereignty from having a fixed 
definition. The indeterminacy of legal terminology permits international lawyers to use terms 
like sovereignty to pursue political aims. When disputes arise, decision-makers must decide 
between competing legal arguments, which require them to make a political choice. The 
decision-maker’s political choice is influenced by the parameters and bias that apply to the 
decision-making body, which varies between different regimes in public international law. 
Consequently, the dominant interpretation of sovereignty in IIL reflects the structural bias 
and political aims of the IIL regime and its decision-makers. Most importantly for this article, 
Koskenniemmi’s approach advocates that legal principles in public international law are 
inherently capable of providing a ‘vocabulary for articulating alternative preferences’.49 As 
such, this article seeks to challenge the mainstream understanding of sovereignty in IIL by 
adopting a different political perspective to that currently employed in IIL. Prior to 
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establishing this minority view, it is necessary to outline the mainstream view of sovereignty 
that currently dominates IIL. 
III. THE MAINSTREAM VIEW IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: 
SOVEREIGNTY AS A LEGAL NORM 
Investment tribunals refer to sovereignty in their awards, most commonly in the guise of a 
host state’s right to regulate. In some instances, this is required as a direct response to explicit 
provisions in IIAs that create public policy exceptions to investment protection standards.50 
In these cases, an investment tribunal is required to recognize the sovereign powers of the 
host state. Consequently, the decision reached will not necessarily reflect the political choice 
that the decision-maker would have made when exercising their judgment free from restraint. 
However, the right to regulate is also considered in the absence of explicit clauses51 giving an 
indication of how investment tribunals view the scope of host states’ sovereign powers in 
general terms. By examining awards from the latter category, it is possible to understand how 
investment tribunals assess the residual role of sovereignty within IIL, identify whether fact 
or law is privileged in the decision-making process and determine how this influences the 
political choice made by decision-makers in IIL. 
Some investment tribunals, such as the tribunal in ADC v Hungary,52 expressly privilege 
normativity within their reasoning. In the context of deciding the foreign investor’s indirect 
expropriation claim, the tribunal in ADC v Hungary stated: 
The Tribunal cannot accept the Respondent’s position that the actions taken by 
it against the Claimants were merely an exercise of its rights under 
international law to regulate its domestic economic and legal affairs. It is the 
Tribunal’s understanding of the basic international law principles that while a 
sovereign State possesses the inherent right to regulate its domestic affairs, the 
exercise of such right is not unlimited and must have its boundaries. As rightly 
pointed out by the Claimants, the rule of law, which includes treaty 
obligations, provides such boundaries. Therefore, when a State enters into a 
bilateral investment treaty like the one in this case, it becomes bound by it and 
the investment-protection obligations it undertook therein must be honored 
rather than ignored by a later argument of the State’s right to regulate.53  
In reaching their conclusion, this tribunal justified the limitations placed on host state 
sovereignty by reference to the ‘rule of law’. In the manner described, the ‘rule of law’ 
equates to the host state being bound by the systemic operation of public international law.54 
As such, binding sources of law, including IIAs, must delimit sovereign power. In taking this 
stance, the investment tribunal prioritized the understanding of sovereignty that privileges the 
legal framework above state conduct. The tribunal’s position in ADC was endorsed by the 
tribunal in Occidental v Ecuador55 and the notion of the ‘rule of law’ was also employed as a 
																																								 																				
50 C Titi, The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law (Hart Publishing 2014) Chapter VII.  
51 ibid 275. 
52 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/16, Award, 2 October 2006 (ADC). 
53 ibid para 423. 
54 See J Waldron, ‘The Rule of International Law’ (2006) 30 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 15. 
55 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of 
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, 5 October 2012 paras 529 – 530 (Occidental). 
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limitation on state sovereignty by the investment tribunal in Quiborax v Bolivia.56 In all of 
these decisions, the host state’s arguments based on their sovereignty were unsuccessful.57 
These awards indicate that when law is privileged above fact in the reasoning of an award, 
the political choice made by the decision-makers often favours the foreign investor.  
Awards such as ADC, Occidental and Quiborax can be critiqued for their reliance on law. 
By privileging normativity, investment tribunals adopt the position that legal principles 
preclude state behaviour that does not conform to investment protection standards. Host state 
sovereignty is then limited accordingly. This position is not entirely defensible as, when 
taken to its logical conclusion, the legal framework will develop solely to achieve IIL’s aims 
without regard to the factual circumstances being addressed by host states in the exercise of 
their sovereignty. If normativity is considered to be paramount, state practice will never give 
rise to boundaries and a legal ideal will result in which all states will be deemed to be able to 
comply with all principles of international investment law in any circumstances. Inherent 
state sovereignty will be excluded by IIAs to such a degree that its exercise by host states will 
be notional.  
In contrast to the awards discussed above, more commonly, tribunals have highlighted 
that host states retain an inherent right to regulate. The S.D. Myers v Canada,58 Saluka v 
Czech Republic59 and Suez and InterAgua v Argentina60 awards expressly emphasize the 
ability of the host state to regulate in the context of expropriation.61 In relation to the fair and 
equitable treatment standard, the Plama v Bulgaria62 and Total v Argentina63 awards confirm 
that the host state’s right to regulate remains a legitimate consideration for investment 
tribunals.64 Most strongly, the tribunal in Lemire v Ukraine65 required that ‘the preferential 
treatment of foreigners be balanced against the legitimate right of Ukraine to pass legislation 
and adopt measures for the protection of what as a sovereign it perceives to be its public 
interest’.66 
Despite these statements, Titi’s review of investment awards that specifically recognize 
the sovereign power of the host state to regulate, results in her identifying several trends67 
that still evidence the privileging of normativity. The first trend noted by Titi is that there is 
no automatic presumption in favour of state sovereignty.68 This, to a certain extent, is to be 
expected, as the opposing views of the awards, highlighted so far, are reflective of the 
decision-making process explained by Koskenniemi. Every decision made will reflect the 
specific legal argumentation presented and take into account the context, nature of the claim 
																																								 																				
56 Quiborax S.A. and Non Metallic Minerals S.A. v Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, 
Award, 16 September 2015, para 89. 
57 ADC (n 52) para 543; Occidental (n 55) para 876; ibid, para 626. 
58 S.D. Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 November 2000 (S.D. Myers). 
59 Saluka Investments B.V. v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 March 2006 (Saluka Investments). 
60 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A. v 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010. 
61 ibid paras 147 – 148; S.D. Myers (n 58) para 263; Saluka Investments (n 59) para 255. 
62 Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, 27 August 2008 
(Plama Consortium Limited). 
63 Total S.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, 27 December 2010. 
64 ibid 123, 309; Plama Consortium Limited (n 62) para 177. 
65 Joseph C. Lemire v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 21 January 
2010 
66 ibid para 273. 
67 Titi (n 50) 288 – 289. 
68 ibid 288. 
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and the audience69 (in this case, the composition of the investment tribunal). Therefore, 
investment awards will vary in terms of the weight given to specific factors. However, over 
the course of multiple awards, certain views will become prevalent and will form the 
mainstream narrative.70 Titi’s assertion supports the view that the mainstream position in IIL 
is one that privileges legal restraints and minimizes the significance of state conduct.  
Second, Titi identifies that the right to regulate is often qualified by terms such as 
‘reasonable’ or ‘legitimate’.71 This form of language implies that host states’ sovereign 
powers have been curtailed by entering into an IIA.72 It is only those aspects of a host state’s 
sovereignty that have not been limited by entering into an IIA that remain operational and are 
therefore ‘reasonable’ or ‘legitimate’. Additionally, when applying these terms, tribunals 
prioritize their view of reasonableness above state conduct, thereby dismissing the 
sovereignty of the state.73 The imposition of limitations on sovereignty based on the legal 
framework and equitable notions provide further evidence that IIL favours legal obligations 
above state practice.  
Finally, Titi highlights that an investment tribunal’s recognition of a right to regulate does 
not necessarily translate into that right being upheld by the tribunal.74 The recognition of state 
sovereignty as an inherent power of the host state, followed by the subsequent failure of 
investment tribunals to base their decision on this inherent power provides an additional 
indication that investment tribunals fail to privilege factual considerations when reaching 
their decisions. Therefore, these awards are also subject to the critique that they tend towards 
a legally dominated view of sovereignty in IIL. 
The manner in which IIL understands sovereignty evidences a political choice by 
decision-makers to privilege law above fact. This approach is reflective of IIL’s structural 
bias and political aims. When viewed from an IIL perspective, sovereignty reduces the 
efficiency of FDI by creating potential barriers for foreign investors to maximize the profits 
from their investment. This attitude mirrors the ‘neo-liberal’ ideology that dominated IIL 
during in the 1990s.75 It was during this time period that the first investment disputes were 
heard,76 and due to the continuing applicability of IIAs drafted at that time, this approach 
continues to apply today.77 ‘Neo-liberalism’ is a form of economic liberalism that seeks to 
minimise market interference, to the extent that states should not regulate beyond the 
protection of property rights.78 Consequently, the mind-set of those implementing the regime 
is to seek to minimize the impact of host state conduct on the investment and to compensate 
the foreign investor when the investment is detrimentally affected by state conduct. To 
achieve this goal, the sovereign powers of a host state should be minimized as sovereignty is 
the origin of conduct that might have a detrimental effect on the investment. In so doing, 
investment tribunals consider the legal limitations placed on the host state’s sovereignty by 
																																								 																				
69 Koskenniemi (n 6) 571. 
70 ibid 569 – 570. 
71 Titi (n 50) 288. 
72 ibid. 
73 Koskenniemi (n 6) 268. 
74 Titi (n 50) 288 - 289. 
75 S Spears, ‘The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Investment Agreements’ (2010) 
13 Journal of International Economic Law 1037, 1040.	
76 Asian Agricultural Products LTD (AAPL) v Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, 
27 June 1990. 
77 Spears (n 75) 1040. 
78 ibid, 1041. 
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reference to the terms of the IIA. This achieves the ‘optimal result’79 for the IIL regime, 
which understands the role of the law as being to facilitate the regime’s objectives and not to 
protect state sovereignty.80 For host states, the only defence they have against a foreign 
investor’s claims that they have breached an IIA is to rely on their state sovereignty.81 Yet, 
through the establishment of the IIL regime, there has been a deferral of state power to 
decision-makers in IIL who consider state sovereignty as being limited by legal constraints. 
By prioritizing legal justifications, the decision-makers in IIL delimit the scope of a host 
state’s sovereign power.82 This minimizes the applicability of fact-driven approaches to 
sovereignty that support host state claims.  
The practice of investment tribunals either expressly or implicitly privileges normativity 
over state conduct when addressing sovereignty in IIL. Tribunals such as ADC, Occidental 
and Quiborax specifically refer to a normative construct of sovereignty when they delimit 
sovereign power by reference to the rule of law. Tribunals that recognize a host state’s 
sovereign right to regulate either implicitly condition sovereignty by reference to terms such 
as ‘reasonable’ or ‘legitimate’, or when making their political choice, privilege legal 
obligations. Both positions minimize the significance of state conduct and illustrate the 
preferred political choice of decision-makers in IIL. The political choice adopted may not be 
surprising in light of IIL’s structural bias and the ‘neo-liberal’ political agenda that it follows. 
Nonetheless, in light of the consistent preference that is given to legal considerations over 
factual circumstances by investment tribunals when considering sovereignty, IIL is subject to 
the critique that it favours legal norms above host state sovereignty. As such, it can be 
countered by the argument that sovereignty in IIL can support a different political aim, that 
is, the exercise of host state sovereign power. 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW: SOVEREIGNTY BASED ON THE RIGHT TO 
ECONOMIC SELF-DETERMINATION  
Koskenniemi iterates that international legal discourse cannot fully accept any form of legal 
argumentation.83 Consequently, whilst the mainstream view of sovereignty in IIL that pursues 
‘neo-liberalism’ can be justified to a certain extent, an alternative stance that supports the 
exercise of a host state’s sovereign power is equally tenable. This section of the article sets 
out the foundations for this alternative argument by reference to the right to economic self-
determination.  
The adoption of self-determination as the basis for re-imagining sovereignty in IIL is 
justifiable in light of the debates regarding economic self-determination that occurred during 
the 1960s and 1970s. These debates focused on the creation of a New International Economic 
Order (NIEO) which directly influenced the establishment of the modern IIL regime. The 
historical relationship between sovereignty, IIL and economic self-determination provides the 
foundation for an alternative view of sovereignty in IIL.84  
The intersection of self-determination, sovereignty and IIL arose during the 
decolonization process. Whilst decolonization should have resulted in full independence for 
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the newly decolonized developing states, they were discontent with their ‘purely nominal 
political independence’.85 To achieve complete independence, developing states additionally 
sought economic decolonization.86 FDI contributed to the lack of economic independence of 
developing states.87 Foreign investors from developed states continued to export developing 
states’ natural resources,88 and by so doing, denied developing states their sovereign rights 
over the resources and, as a corollary, their economic independence.89 In response, many 
developing states exercised their sovereignty to expropriate foreign investments.90  
To justify their actions, expropriating states used two legal principles in parallel; 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and economic self-determination.91 By the mid-
1960s, both of these concepts had been formulated as legal principles in United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 180392 and Common Article 1(2) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights93 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights94 respectively. As a newly formulated right,95 economic self-
determination provided a strong foundation for developing states to assert their sovereignty 
and to try and disrupt the colonial structures that underpinned FDI.  
Whilst FDI was a significant hindrance for developing states, it was only one aspect of 
their broader goal of achieving economic parity. Developing states sought to create a NIEO 
to redistribute global wealth more equitably among states.96 To provide a legal basis for the 
proposed change, the NIEO was raised by developing states in the UNGA in 1974.97 This 
resulted in the generation of three UNGA Resolutions specifying what changes were required 
to establish a NIEO.98 It was in this context that further reforms to FDI were proposed. The 
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International Law and Policy 157, 166; K Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, 
Environment and the Safeguarding of Capital (CUP 2013), 78. 
89 UNCTAD, Trends in International Investment Agreements: An Overview (1999), 16. 
90 S Asante, 'International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal' (1988) 37 ICLQ 588, 594; Vandevelde 
(n 88) 166.  
91 A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP 2004) 211, 212. 
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94 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 Decmeber 1966, entered into 
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR). 
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Declaration on the Establishment of a NIEO99 and the Programme of Action on the 
Establishment of a NIEO100 contained, for example, a host state right to expropriate assets101 
and permitted host states to review concession agreements.102 The Charter of the Economic 
Rights and Duties of States103 included, amongst other things, a domestic measure of 
compensation for expropriation and removed the requirement that the expropriation was to be 
undertaken for a public purpose.104 These resolutions specifically relied on the right to 
economic self-determination to achieve these aims.105 Thus, economic self-determination 
provided the foundation for sovereign acts affecting FDI. 
The position taken by developing states in these UNGA Resolutions was contentious, 
partly due to the altered foundations of the law on expropriation.106 As a result, developed 
states did not vote in favour of the NIEO and dismissed its content as it did not comply with 
established standards of international law.107 This enabled developed states to maintain their 
standing in the international and economic arenas,108 and the NIEO did not materialize.109 
However, the NIEO was not without impact. The changes to FDI proposed by developing 
states during the NIEO generated significant legal uncertainty110 and risk for foreign 
investors, especially in relation to the threat of expropriations.111 Accordingly, treaties were 
used to regulate state conduct that was likely to affect foreign investors.112 This process 
generated the contemporary treaty based IIL regime.113 As such, the right to economic self-
determination (as a justification for exercising sovereign rights over FDI) is intrinsically 
linked to IIL.  
The historical relationship between sovereignty, IIL and economic self-determination is 
significant for two reasons. First, the intersection between IIL and the right to economic self-
determination permits legal argumentation based on the right to self-determination within the 
IIL regime. IIL is a specialist regime within public international law that has developed its 
own structural bias.114 Consequently, investment tribunals are likely to dismiss arguments 
that rely on concepts that are external to the regime.115 Arguments based on human rights that 
are linked to IIL, such as the protection of property interests or the right to a fair trial, have 
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115 See Border Timbers Limited, Border Timbers International (Private) Limited, and Hangani Development Co. 
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been accepted by investment tribunals.116 Hence, given the pre-existing association between 
IIL and the right to self-determination, legal arguments that rely on the right to economic 
self-determination as the basis for sovereignty are capable of falling within the scope of IIL’s 
specialist focus. 
Secondly, and more fundamentally, the historical relationship between IIL and economic 
self-determination illustrates the extent to which the current understanding of sovereignty in 
IIL restricts the economic independence of many host states. The motivation behind the 
NIEO was to provide newly decolonized states with economic freedom through the 
independent exercise of their sovereign powers.117 Instead of the NIEO, a Washington 
Consensus driven economic model was adopted in IIL.118 Due to the lack of alternative 
sources of finance,119 the widespread acceptance of FDI in accordance with this economic 
model resulted in the imposition of a market ideology on the economies of many states.120 
This undermined the economic sovereignty of these states and restricted their economic 
independence. Further, the mainstream view of sovereignty in IIL based on ‘neo-liberalism’ 
has continued to stifle the economic independence of host states (both developing and 
developed) by delimiting state powers. Hence, the scope of host state economic policies is 
also dictated by IIAs, preventing the full exercise of their right to economic self-
determination. The limitations currently imposed by IIL on a host state’s sovereign power 
generate the need for a contrary political outlook in IIL. Therefore, a political perspective that 
empowers host states forms the basis of the proposed, alternative understanding of 
sovereignty in IIL. 
The formulation of sovereignty in IIL suggested in this article significantly differs from 
the arguments presented by developing states during the NIEO. The factual and political 
changes that generated the understanding of sovereignty during the 1960s and 1970s were 
specific to the transformations brought about by the decolonization process. The economic 
independence of developing states from their former colonial powers provided the central 
focus of the legal arguments presented to the international community. In a postcolonial 
setting, these arguments become less compelling. Further, the validity of the arguments 
presented during the NIEO may be questionable even in the context of decolonization given 
their requirement for wholesale global economic change.121 In contrast, the formulation of 
sovereignty proposed in this article focuses not on economic independence from former 
colonial powers, but the ability of a host state population to determine its own economic 
agenda. This approach applies equally to populations in developing and developed states. 
Relying on the mandate of the host state population as the source of sovereign power, rather 
than limiting sovereign power by reference to legal norms, can generate a new understanding 
of sovereignty in IIL when based on the right to economic self-determination. 
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Whilst all legal argumentation necessarily requires reference to principles of international 
law,122 the argument that sovereignty is based on the right to economic self-determination 
infers that economic self-determination has a distinct meaning. However, the term self-
determination is itself indeterminate and, therefore, attempts to confer this right with meaning 
will reflect the privileging of fact or law. As this remains an unavoidable aspect of legal 
argumentation, the view of economic self-determination proposed will reflect a mainstream 
understanding of the concept.123 
In a postcolonial context, the continued role of the right to self-determination was 
questioned.124 However, reference to the right to self-determination in legal instruments125 
and its application by international126 and domestic courts,127 as well as to various states128 
beyond the context of decolonization indicates that the right retains a significant (if not 
contested) function in public international law.129 The postcolonial use of the right to self-
determination suggests that the right must be interpreted to mean something more than giving 
rise to independence from former colonial powers.130 Therefore, it is essential to identify the 
contemporary role of self-determination in international law in order to understand how 
economic self-determination can enable an alternative view of sovereignty in IIL. Given the 
indivisibility of the right to self-determination,131 economic self-determination is linked to the 
right to political self-determination. Hence, this article proceeds on the premise that economic 
self-determination can be considered to be an ongoing right that offers ‘peoples’ the ability to 
choose their domestic economic policies through constitutional and political processes.  
The essence of the right to self-determination is the element of free choice.132 Although 
this choice was for political independence during the colonial era, the exercise of the right to 
self-determination did not require this outcome.133 As a result, the right to self-determination 
is not tied to independence but it is linked to choice regarding the political and economic 
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systems of a state, as well as the social and cultural practices adopted by its population.134 
Therefore, economic self-determination provides for a choice between different economic 
systems.135 
The choice is usually exercised through electing a representative government.136 In 
accordance with this view, a host state population will have mandated the economic policies 
of an elected government.137 When circumstances change, the government can rely on the 
existing mandate or alter their mandate to address the specific situation.138 To provide the 
state’s population with a choice, the right to economic self-determination entails a duty of 
transparency.139 This requires that a state provide its population with access to relevant 
information.140 As a result, economic self-determination requires an interface between the 
government and the population it represents. Rather than providing for substantive rights,141 
economic self-determination can be seen as a right to a process by which a state’s population 
is consulted regarding future economic policies.142 Therefore, although some elements of 
substance precondition the right,143 economic self-determination can be framed more 
procedurally than substantively.144 The applicable procedures are usually contained in the 
constitution and political processes of the state.145 The constitutional and political processes 
of the state can be broadly construed. Although the specific processes will vary from state to 
state, they can include elections, referenda, judicial review, formal and informal consultation 
mechanisms, petitions, public protests and attendance at public meetings.146 In essence, the 
host state population must be permitted to express their view as to which economic policy is 
their preferred choice through legitimate constitutional and political means. This 
constitutional relationship provides the link between sovereignty and economic self-
determination.147 The sovereign powers of the state must be exercised in a manner that 
correlates with the choice of the population so as to give effect to the right to economic self-
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determination. The government can be held accountable in accordance with the constitution 
should they fail to do so.148 
To enable choice, and to hold the government to account, the right to self-determination 
needs to function as a continuing right.149 The formulation of the right in various legal texts 
suggests that the right is an ongoing one.150 It cannot be presumed that political, social, 
cultural and economic aspects of the state are to be fixed at the time of political independence 
of the state.151 This would undermine the independence of the newly formed state as 
demonstrated by the concerns raised by newly independent states prior to debating the 
creation of the NIEO. Further, the continuing nature of the right aligns with the procedural 
nature of economic self-determination that is tied to constitutional systems. As stated by the 
Canadian Supreme Court in Reference re Secession of Quebec from Canada:152 
[t]he recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-
determination is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination – a 
people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development 
within the framework of an existing state.153 
Whereas self-determination has classically been conceived as a justification for the 
existence of a state,154 the postcolonial right to economic self-determination is conferred upon 
‘peoples’.155 Consequently, the right to self-determination is clearly not a right of the state.156 
Therefore, the free choice that is exercisable in accordance with self-determination should be 
distinguished from rights possessed by states such as sovereign equality and non-
intervention.157  
Although not a state right, economic self-determination is exercisable within the 
constitutional framework of the state.158 Therefore, the constitutional processes must enable 
the state to consider the views of ‘peoples’. There are divergent views of who constitutes a 
‘peoples’ for the purposes of the postcolonial operation of the right to economic self-
determination.159 One view supports the stance that ‘peoples’ should be linked to the territory 
of the state160 and, consequently, should constitute the entire population of the state.161 This 
interpretation does not automatically accord with the use of ‘all peoples’ in Common Article 
1 as it does not refer to nations,162 although subsequent instruments163 have indicated 
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acceptance of this approach. Further, if the whole population is consulted, majoritarian views 
will prevail, denying self-determination to minority and indigenous groups.164 Conversely, if 
self-determination only focuses on minorities and indigenous groups in the traditional 
sense,165 this denies the majority from being able to contribute to the economic future of the 
state.166 To balance these approaches, it is suggested that the whole population should be 
given the power to determine the economic policies of the state. However, to ensure that 
majoritarian considerations are not automatically prioritized, constitutional consultation 
mechanisms need to be utilized to provide an effective means for minorities and indigenous 
populations to be able to contribute to the debate.167 These mechanisms must respect 
principles such as the need to obtain free, prior, informed consent from indigenous 
populations.168  
Translating this approach to IIL, economic self-determination is an ongoing right that 
offers choice to the host state population to determine their domestic economic policies. This 
is to be achieved through the use of constitutional procedures that require consultation with 
the host state population, whilst ensuring that minority groups and indigenous populations are 
also heard. Provided these conditions are met, and only if these conditions are met, a host 
state is conferred with a mandate that justifies their state practice.169 This foundation provides 
the basis for a factually driven understanding of sovereignty in IIL. When a host state 
population exercises its right to economic self-determination, it is selecting the economic 
model that it considers to be the most appropriate for the state. In so doing, it is acting in the 
political sphere of the host state. The choice made during this process provides the mandate 
within which the host state government must act, which determines how the government’s 
sovereign power should be exercised. Therefore, when the right to economic self-
determination is exercised, the origins of the host state’s sovereign power can be sourced in 
the factual and political realm enabling an understanding of sovereignty that privileges fact 
over law. The arguments regularly presented by host state governments in IIL disputes are 
based on domestic policies that are intended for the betterment of the host state population. 
Should fact be privileged when addressing sovereignty in IIL, this would permit host states to 
refer to the choice of economic policy made by their population as a justification for their 
conduct, thereby relying on the notion of sovereignty. 
The adoption of this alternative understanding of sovereignty in IIL confers host state 
arguments with greater credibility. If a host state’s sovereign act(s) could be justified as the 
exercise of the host state population’s right to economic self-determination, it would be more 
challenging for a decision-maker to dismiss a host state’s argument given the international 
recognition of this right. Investment protection standards could be re-interpreted to take into 
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account the factual and political justifications that gave rise to the host state’s exercise of 
sovereign power, which forms the basis of the dispute. Decision-makers in IIL could generate 
exceptions to investment protection standards and limit the mainstream, normative 
construction of sovereignty. Even though relying on a factual understanding of sovereignty 
may strengthen the host state’s argument, the final outcome of any dispute would still be 
resolved by the decision-maker’s political choice. This allows decision-makers to continue to 
support a normative understanding of sovereignty. Yet, when privileging normativity, a 
decision-maker would be simultaneously denying the right of economic self-determination to 
the host state population. Given this consequence, decision-makers may be more reluctant to 
adopt legally driven understandings of sovereignty in IIL. 
Similarly to the mainstream view, the suggested approach to sovereignty in IIL can be 
critiqued. In particular, the proposed view can be countered by referring to the ability of host 
states to ignore the normative framework that governs IIL on the basis of the mandate of their 
population. This view arguably could be used to deny the operation of all investment 
protection standards. As such, it would lead to sovereignty being used as an excuse for the 
unlimited exercise of state power.170 This criticism is valid, however, the use of a legal 
understanding of sovereignty can deny a host state from exercising its sovereignty when it 
needs to act in the best interests of its population. In accordance with Koskenniemi’s views, 
neither argument inherently prevails,171 so the criticisms that can be levelled at a factual 
understanding of sovereignty are equally as valid as the criticisms levelled at the normative 
approach. Therefore, the mainstream approach and the alternative view are equally 
justifiable.  
The formulation of an alternative view of sovereignty in IIL based on the right to 
economic self-determination is founded on a political view that permits host states to exercise 
sovereign powers. It reflects a factually driven understanding of sovereignty. The adoption of 
this standpoint is validated by reference to the historical development of the international 
investment law regime. It relies upon a postcolonial understanding of economic self-
determination, which provides for an ongoing right that offers ‘peoples’ the ability to choose 
their domestic economic policies through constitutional and political processes. Although 
erring towards unlimited state power, the suggested understanding of sovereignty is equally 
as valid as a normative approach to sovereignty. It is on this basis that the use of sovereignty 
in IIL can be re-imagined. The proposed approach to sovereignty counters the mainstream 
understanding of this term and undermines the current universality of the dominant approach 
to sovereignty in IIL. It highlights the limited conception of sovereignty that is applied in IIL. 
This alternative narrative permits an unrestrained view of sovereignty to be espoused within 
IIL. This can facilitate a broader understanding of the legal framework that governs IIL. 
Further, as international law is not fixed,172 and mainstream views are capable of change,173 
this alternative approach has the potential to become the mainstream view in IIL. However, 
this is dependent on the prevailing political circumstances.174 Therefore, for this view to be 
adopted, the political climate must warrant an investment tribunal considering and adopting 
this new political position. The current political climate surrounding IIL suggests that the 
proposed, alternative understanding of sovereignty is the most appropriate political choice for 
investment tribunals. 
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V. ‘A GROWING TREND’: TRANSPARENCY IN IIL 
The politics surrounding IIL have centred on the ability of foreign investors to invoke IIAs to 
challenge host state conduct in a private dispute resolution forum. In response, there is ‘a 
growing trend’ towards transparency in IIL.175 This trend supports the adoption of the 
alternative understanding of sovereignty in IIL proposed in this article. This is because 
transparency in IIL permits host state populations to have access to the necessary information 
to choose their preferred economic policy. As such, it enables the exercise of economic self-
determination and increases the accountability of the IIL regime.176 
Transparency can take a variety of forms in IIL.177 For the purposes of this article, the 
discussion of transparency will focus on how a host state population can be informed of 
developments in IIL that are likely to influence their choice of economic policy when 
exercising their right to economic self-determination. The first aspect of transparency that 
will be addressed is the means by which a host state population can become aware of the 
details of investment disputes. The second element to be considered will be the dissemination 
of information to the host state population regarding the negotiation of IIAs.  
Due to its commercial arbitration origins,178 investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) has 
traditionally been confidential. This has precluded host state populations from attending the 
dispute settlement process without party consent,179 viewing supporting documents180 and, in 
some instances, accessing investment awards.181 However, the introduction of transparency 
procedures in NAFTA182 resulted in the adoption of transparency provisions in other IIAs.183 
This general move towards transparency was further bolstered in 2014 when UNCITRAL 
produced a tailored structure for creating transparency in ISDS. This structure enables a host 
state population to exercise its right to economic self-determination. 
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UNCITRAL’s recent initiative on transparency has significantly widened the scope of 
transparency in ISDS. First, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based 
Investor-State Arbitration (Transparency Rules)184 create a presumption of increased 
transparency in ISDS for disputes185 for IIAs that have been entered into since 1 April 
2014.186 Disputing parties are required to disclose the notice of arbitration,187 submissions 
and arbitral awards.188 The duty does not apply if the parties opt out,189 or if information is 
confidential (or protected) or is contrary to essential security interests.190 This presumption 
counters both the traditional confidentiality of ISDS and the neutral stance that has been 
adopted by investment tribunals more recently on the issue of transparency.191 Although 
automatically applying to disputes governed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the 
Transparency Rules can apply to arbitrations conducted in accordance with other arbitration 
rules (for example, the ICSID Arbitration Rules).192 Consequently, UNCITRAL’s framework 
has the potential to significantly alter the transparency of proceedings across all forms of 
ISDS. The Transparency Rules are supplemented by the United Nations Convention on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Mauritius Convention)193 that 
permits states to apply the Transparency Rules in disputes involving IIAs entered into prior to 
1 April 2014.194 For the Mauritius Convention to apply, the home and host state must be 
signatories, in which case the Transparency Rules are mandatory.195 Alternatively, they can 
apply with host state and foreign investor agreement.196 Given that most investment disputes 
will be governed by IIAs entered into before 1 April 2014, the scope of application of the 
Transparency Rules is considerably widened by the operation of the Mauritius Convention. 
Finally, all documents that have been disclosed will be placed on the Transparency Registry 
run by UNCITRAL.197 The creation of a central repository for this information streamlines 
the process of retrieving publicly accessible materials relating to investment disputes. 
The combination of the Transparency Rules, the Mauritius Convention and the 
Transparency Registry reflects a significant transition towards transparency in IIL.198 
Information about investment disputes that was previously confidential will be readily 
accessible to host state populations. By enabling host state populations to understand the 
details of investment arbitration that affect the state, they can evaluate the conduct of 
government officials and consider the strength of the government’s defence of the claim.199 
																																								 																				
184 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (16 December 2013) UN Doc 
A/Res/68/109 <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-
Transparency-E.pdf> (UNCITRAL Transparency Rules). 
185 See Schill (n 188) 369. 
186 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules (n 184), art 1(1).  
187 ibid, art 2. 
188 ibid, art 3. 
189 ibid, art 1(1). 
190 ibid, art 7(2) and 7(5). 
191 See Biwater (n 180) para 121. 
192 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules (n 184), art 1(9). 
193 United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (adopted. 10 
December 2014, opened for signature 17 March 2015, not yet in force) 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Transparency-Convention-
e.pdf> (Mauritius Convention). 
194 See UNCITRAL Transparency Rules (n 184), art 1(2) and Mauritius Convention (n 193), art 1(1). 
195 Mauritius Convention (n 193), art 2(1). 
196 ibid, art 2(2). 
197 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules (n 184), art 8. 
198 See Schill (n 175); Calamita (n 175). 
199 Ortino (n 177) 134; Hofmann and Tams (n 175) 201 – 202. 
Accepted for publication in International and Comparative Law Quarterly on 5 April 2016 
© British Institute of International and Comparative Law 
 
20 
	
Should it be necessary, they can hold the government to account through their constitutional 
and political processes.200 However a host state population responds to investment disputes, 
they can create a mandate based on the factual situation existing in the host state. The ability 
of a host state population to do this forms a fundamental aspect of the right to economic self-
determination. Therefore, this form of transparency supports the creation of an alternative 
understanding of sovereignty in IIL. 
A second trend has been the development of a transparency policy in relation to the 
negotiation of IIAs, which is most notable in relation to the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). The TTIP is a proposed trade agreement between the 
European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) that also seeks to open the 
market for investment and services.201 Although the EU is not a state, and as such economic 
self-determination is not directly applicable, the notions of accountability and good 
governance embodied by this right are transferable to the EU, which has the mandate to enter 
into IIAs on behalf of its Member States.  
The creation of the TTIP has become controversial following the involvement of civil 
society groups who are opposed to its terms. These groups have been able to gain information 
about the proposed agreement as a result of increasing transparency and have the potential to 
influence the economic policies that the TTIP seeks to achieve through actions that are 
analogous to the exercise of the right to economic self-determination. This development 
supports the adoption of an alternative understanding of sovereignty.  
The initial discussions regarding the TTIP involved low levels of transparency. In July 
2014, the European Ombudsman, acting on her own initiative, launched an inquiry into the 
lack of transparency in relation to the TTIP.202 This resulted in several changes. In October 
2014, the TTIP negotiating mandate was published for the first time.203 By November 2014, 
both the new president of the EU Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, and the newly 
appointed European Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malström emphasized the need for a 
‘fresh start’ with regards to the transparency of the TTIP.204 The ‘fresh start’ included the 
disclosure of negotiating texts and TTIP documents being shared between the Commission, 
European Parliament and Council.205 This enabled the negotiating aims of the parties to the 
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TTIP to be scrutinized, both within the EU and more widely by the populations of the 
Member States that would be affected by the agreement. However, only EU documents are 
being released. The Commission’s position is that it would need explicit agreement of the 
USA for the release of documents that the USA has generated.206 Despite this significant 
limitation, the Commission continued to release EU documentation on the TTIP. Following 
the European Ombudsman’s decision,207 on 7 January 2015, the EU published proposed legal 
texts in areas governed by the TTIP, new position papers, factsheets and a ‘Reader’s 
Guide’.208 The European Ombudsman welcomed this move, but she recommended that 
further steps be taken to improve transparency and stated that USA resistance was not 
sufficient to deny EU citizens transparency.209 The actions of the European Ombudsman 
generated sufficient pressure to enable the release of key documents regarding the TTIP. This 
provided civil society groups with enough information to raise concerns regarding the 
potential implications of the TTIP.  
The impact of increased transparency became evident on 13 January 2015 when the 
findings of a public consultation on investment protection and ISDS in TTIP were 
published.210 Many of the responses were from civil society groups that did not support the 
TTIP and utilized a pro forma response to the consultation that was intended to demonstrate 
how unpopular the TTIP was in certain sections of society.211 In response to the outcome of 
the public consultation, Malström recognized the need to consult with civil society.212 Whilst 
proceeding with the TTIP, the Commission is more cognizant of the need to ensure that they 
have the support of key sectors within host state populations. The reaction of civil society 
groups to the TTIP is analogous to the exercise of their right to economic self-determination. 
As part of a population affected by an economic decision, civil society groups have made a 
choice regarding their preferred economic policy using their freedom of expression, which 
forms a fundamental aspect of democratic participation.213 By taking into account the 
objections to the TTIP from civil society groups, the Commission is, in effect, responding to 
the exercise of this ‘right’.  
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The progress made by the Commission, albeit not always of its own volition, evidences 
the growing demand for transparency in relation to economic policies. The Commission has 
responded to calls for transparency to provide the negotiation procedure with accountability 
and credibility in the public eye.214 The need for credibility reflects that the Commission 
requires a mandate from the populations of its Member States. Yet, through the provision of 
this information, the Commission has been made aware that its proposals in the TTIP do not 
have the full support of many sectors of the TTIP’s potential host state populations. The 
reaction of civil society groups to the TTIP is only as a result of the increased transparency of 
the negotiations. The TTIP evidences how transparency supports an alternative understanding 
of sovereignty in IIL based on how members of civil society groups acted in a manner 
analogous to exercising the right to economic self-determination. The approach adopted by 
civil society groups in response to the TTIP is capable of functioning on a larger scale within 
the traditional framework of the right to self-determination. With increased transparency, all 
interested sectors of the host state population would be able to contribute to the discussion of 
their state’s economic policy, enabling them to exercise their right to economic self-
determination. This supports the adoption of an alternative view of sovereignty in IIL. 
The development of recent transparency initiatives, both in relation to informing host 
state populations regarding any existing disputes, and the negotiation of further IIAs, 
evidence that civil society is seeking to engage with economic policy and highlights the need 
for states and regional organizations to provide access to these materials so that host state 
populations can be fully informed. This political momentum can provide the impetus for 
altering the understanding of sovereignty in IIL. As transparency assists host state 
populations to exercise their right to economic self-determination,215 it is only appropriate 
that the understanding of sovereignty in IIL enables its full exercise.  
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF 
SOVEREIGNTY IN IIL 
An alternative view of sovereignty in IIL facilitates a broader understanding of sovereignty, 
and given the trend towards transparency in IIL, can challenge the mainstream narrative as 
the dominant perspective in IIL. Should the proposed notion of sovereignty be adopted, this is 
likely to affect how IIL functions both in terms of the formulation of IIAs and ISDS. 
However, it is submitted that the acceptance of this approach will not require radical changes 
to the IIL regime.  
New generation IIAs evolve in response to investment tribunal awards and to reflect the 
broader impacts of FDI. The proposed understanding of sovereignty creates a mandate for the 
host state to initiate reforms to IIAs that reflect the will of the host state population. When 
host states negotiate IIAs with this mandate, it is anticipated that they would be more creative 
in aligning investment protection standards with the protection of policy and regulatory 
space.216 For example, in several investment awards, host states have formulated their 
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arguments based on their sovereign right to regulate environmental law.217 Several IIAs now 
contain exemptions for environmental laws and labour standards.218 Adopting the proposed 
view of sovereignty in IIL could lead to changes to the terms of IIAs such as the inclusion of 
further provisions protecting human rights, labour and environmental standards. In contrast, 
new terms may mirror the desired economic policies of the host state. Therefore, the 
alternative narrative suggested is not a re-working of IIL, but rather, it emphasizes reforms 
that are currently being pursued within the IIL regime that seek to promote and protect the 
host state’s right to regulate219 as part of IIL’s continuing evolution. 
Existing IIAs could be interpreted in light of state practice between treaty parties.220 The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties221 enables a treaty interpreter to take into account 
subsequent state practice as part of the primary stage of treaty interpretation.222 This approach 
was taken when the Free Trade Commission of NAFTA issued a joint interpretative 
statement to limit the scope of the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and 
security’ standards in Article 1105 of NAFTA.223 By doing so, the state parties to NAFTA 
limited the impact that Article 1105 NAFTA would have on their sovereign powers. 
Consequently, states could use subsequent practice as a means to ensure that existing IIAs are 
construed in a manner consistent with the mandate conferred upon them by their population 
when they exercise the right to economic self-determination. 
In whatever form new or amended IIAs take, it is likely that there will be greater public 
acceptance of their terms given the direct mandate from the host state population. 
Consequently, the strong reaction to the provisions of the TTIP would be less likely to occur. 
There is also likely to be a decreased risk of conflict between FDI projects and minority and 
indigenous populations when their perspectives are reflected in the mandate of the state.224 
The proposed understanding of sovereignty could increase the sensitivity of foreign investors 
to the potential impacts of their investment projects, thereby reducing disputes over 
regulatory measures that may negatively impact the profitability of those projects. The 
methodological difficulties of addressing the intersection between IIL and, for example, 
human rights obligations,225 could, to a certain degree, be averted with this approach. 
Even with well-drafted IIAs, disputes regarding FDI will arise. Investment tribunals are 
then required to interpret IIAs to reach a resolution. If investment tribunals are willing to 
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privilege state practice over normative considerations when addressing sovereignty, host 
states can legitimately refer to their sovereign right to regulate in a manner that would be 
accepted by an investment tribunal. For example, actions taken in response to economic and 
constitutional crises, such as the Argentinian economic collapse of 2001-02, would be 
considered to be sovereign acts that are not automatically limited by reference to the terms of 
IIAs. This enables host states to manage their domestic jurisdiction with more freedom than 
IIAs currently permit. Investment tribunals regularly consider the sovereign power of the host 
state in investment awards. Therefore, current practice would not change. However, given the 
lack of defences available to host states in IIL, increasing an investment tribunal’s ability to 
consider the purpose of the host state’s sovereign acts involves a more substantial adjustment 
to ISDS. Nonetheless, this could reduce the controversy surrounding IIL by conferring the 
regime with increased legitimacy from the perspective of host state populations. Further, it 
might reduce the dissatisfaction of some host states with the outcomes of ISDS and the IIL 
regime more generally.226 
It is recognized that the creation of IIAs and the interpretation of investment protection 
standards in the manner described will generate innovative provisions in IIAs and new legal 
understandings of the term ‘sovereignty’. This outcome is not problematic. Koskenniemi 
recognizes that legal norms are not automatically linked to restricting sovereignty.227 
Therefore, host states would still be able to fully exercise their sovereign powers. Further, the 
new legal principles generated will merely act as reference points for future legal 
argumentation, permitting mainstream and alternative views of sovereignty to develop. As 
international law is not fixed, arguments will advance, and if necessary, the mainstream view 
can alter its position accordingly.  
The acceptance of the proposed view of sovereignty will affect the balance of IIL. By 
expressing a minority view in IIL, this narrative has the potential to alter the terms of new 
IIAs to favour host state interests and may give more leeway for interpretations of investment 
protection standards that respect state sovereignty. Nevertheless, this would not require 
radical changes to the IIL regime. Rather, it would result in the evolution of the regime, 
giving rise to more nuanced decision-making and a new form of normativity in IIL that 
would be subject to further legal argumentation. Therefore, the adoption of a new perspective 
on sovereignty in IIL allows the regime to reflect the interests of those states most affected by 
it. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This article has presented a minority view of how sovereignty can operate in IIL based on a 
new political perspective. By relying on the right to economic self-determination, this view of 
sovereignty enables host state populations to create a mandate that reflects the factual and 
political elements of the IIL regime. Given this, the article has sought to emphasize the 
narrow, normative conception of sovereignty that is currently applied within IIL. By 
expanding the concept of sovereignty in IIL to take into account factual considerations, the 
regime can be conferred with greater credibility. Host states will be able to regulate more 
freely and critiques of IIL that focus on the restrictions placed on host state sovereignty will 
become less prevalent. This outcome will only occur if IIL is able to expand its limited ethos. 
This will not be an easy task due to the movement of power away from the state towards 
decision-makers in IIL as a result of the fragmentation of public international law. There is 
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potential for fundamental reform if the proposed understanding of sovereignty were to be 
adopted as the mainstream view. The current political climate encouraging transparency in 
IIL supports such a move, but the power to make changes remains with the decision-makers 
and whether their political choices are sufficiently influenced by these developments. If 
decision-makers fail to address the current critiques of IIL, and continue to limit host state 
sovereign power by adopting the mainstream position, IIL runs the risk of ostracising host 
states. To prevent this from happening, some latitude must be given for host states to act in 
the best interests of their populations. The framework presented in this article provides one 
possible avenue to address this concern.  
